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I. INTRODUCTION
Countless books, articles, web sites, and blogs discuss resiliency;
most major scientific and industry non-governmental organizations
have produced resiliency reports;1 and many universities have held resiliency symposia. One 2013 report identified nearly fifty different definitions of resilience dating back to the early 1970s.2 From this rich liter

J.D., Lewis and Clark Law School (1997); M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, B.S., Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. Jeff Litwak is in-house counsel for the Columbia
River Gorge Commission, an interstate compact agency in White Salmon, Washington, and
an Adjunct Professor of Law at Lewis and Clark Law School where he teaches interstate
compact law and land use law.
1. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON INCREASING NATIONAL RESILIENCE TO HAZARDS AND
DISASTERS, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY, POLICY AND GLOBAL
AFFAIRS, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative (Nat’l Acad.
Press 2012); LARSEN L. RAJKOVICH ET AL., GREEN BUILDING AND CLIMATE RESILIENCE:
UNDERSTANDING IMPACTS AND PREPARING FOR CHANGING CONDITIONS (2011); ABHAS K. JHA
ET AL., BUILDING URBAN RESILIENCE: PRINCIPLES, TOOLS, AND PRACTICE (
.
2. CMTY. & REG’L RESILIENCE INST., DEFINITIONS OF COMMUNITY RESILIENCE: AN
ANALYSIS 2–9 (2013).
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ature, terms such as “ecosystem resiliency,”3 “social resiliency,”4 “system
resilience,”5 and “economic resilience”6 have become commonplace.
These and other resilience terms typically present varying themes of
reducing risk of various shocks or disasters; reducing effects of climate
change; or the need to build, strengthen, and enhance capacity to rapidly and readily recover from disaster.
Also from this literature, we know that resilience is an interdisciplinary issue involving fields such as engineering, 7 energy delivery,8
emergency services,9 food and water security,10 and law enforcement
and domestic security.11 Creating resilient communities also “requires
combinations of apparent opposites, including redundancy and efficiency, diversity and interdependence, strength and flexibility, autonomy
and collaboration, and planning and adaptability.” 12 Resilience literature is, however, comparatively slim on discussing the most basic underlying premise: that communities already have some base level of services and infrastructure, or rather, communities have something to
make resilient.
Small towns with low tax bases have difficulty providing services
and infrastructure for day-to-day use.13 Without functional services and
infrastructure, these towns obviously cannot provide those services or
use that infrastructure during emergencies. Such small towns, like
3. A. Bryan Endres & Jody M. Endres, Homeland Security Planning: What
Victory Gardens and Fidel Castro Can Teach Us in Preparing for Food Crises in the United
States, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405, 4 9 (
9 (“ecosystem resiliency” describes “buffering
capacity (i.e., the ability to absorb shocks without structural change .” .
4. Id. (“social resiliency” describes the ability of “communities to withstand
external shocks to their social infrastructure.” .
5. Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration
in Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8,
(
9 (“system resilience” describes the
“capacity of a system to tolerate change, to persist, and to adapt in an unpredictable and
variable environment.” .
6. See, e.g., Edward Hill et al., Economic Shocks and Regional Economic
Resilience 1 (MacArthur Found. Research Network on Bldg. Resilient Regions, Working
Paper 2011-03, 2011).
7. See, e.g., THOMAS FISHER, DESIGNING TO AVOID DISASTER: THE NATURE OF
FRACTURE-CRITICAL DESIGN (Routledge 2012).
8. RAJKOVICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 22.
9. E.g., Portland State University offers a Professional Certificate in Emergency
Leadership and Community Resilience. See Emergency Leadership & Community
Resilience, PORTLAND ST. U., http://www.pdx.edu/cps/emergency-leadership-communityresilience (last visited May 21, 2014).
10. E.g., Jeremy Allouche, The Sustainability and Resilience of Global Water and

Food Systems: Political Analysis of the Interplay Between Security, Resource Scarcity,
Political Systems and Global Trade, 36 FOOD POL’Y 1, S3–S8 (2011).
11. See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMPLEMENTING 9/11 COMMISSION
RECOMMENDATIONS:
PROGRESS
REPORT
2011
30
(2011),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing-9-11-commission-report-progress-2011.pdf.
12. David R. Godschalk, Urban Hazard Mitigation: Creating Resilient Cities, 4
NAT. HAZARDS REV. 136, 139 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 374 n.126 (1990); Ronald Kaiser, A Problem in Search of a Solution,
67 TEX. B.J. 188, 191 (2004).
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towns of any size and affluence, frequently turn to intergovernmental
agreements with neighboring towns or county governments to jointly
construct and maintain physical infrastructure and jointly purchase or
share human services14—they are, in resilience terms, “interdependent.”
But not all towns are equally able to use such agreements.
The forty-eight contiguous states and the District of Columbia collectively create 109 state border pairs. 15 Many towns and areas on these
borders are isolated intrastate, but have neighbors in adjoining states,
and thus have few options for joint and cooperative action except with
towns and areas in the adjacent state. 16 To engage these cross-border
neighbors, these communities must contend with intergovernmental
cooperation statutes that contain different authorities for cooperative
arrangements, require additional burdens on cross-border agreements,
and statutes and regulations that contain differing or conflicting requirements for services and infrastructure. 17 These additional complexities of creating interstate, intergovernmental agreements across state
borders, that is, creating interdependence, may reduce the number of
such agreements and thus the resiliency of border areas.
Section II of this article briefly discusses how multi-governmental
action (interdependence) provides efficient and stable urban services
and infrastructure and is thus a necessary component of resiliency. Section III describes the range of authority for interstate intergovernmental cooperation. Section IV discusses two common fundamental differences between the states’ statutes authorizing intergovernmental
agreements across state lines that complicate such agreements. Finally,
section V provides two examples of joint, shared, and coordinated action
in relatively remote Oregon-Washington border communities despite
those fundamental problems. I use this border in part because it is my
home territory and in part because comparing two states is more manageable than discussing all 109 permutations of interstate intergovernmental agreements; but more importantly because Oregon and Washington’s statutes are quite different and thus illustrate 18 the complex
legal questions and political concerns that may discourage interstate
intergovernmental agreements.

14. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 13, at 378; Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental
Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 99 (2003).
15. This includes the Four Corners states as sharing a border with the states they
oppose. See Thomas J. Holmes, The Effect of State Policies on the Location of
Manufacturing: Evidence from State Borders, 106 J. POL. ECON. 667, 697 (1998).
16. See, e.g., infra Part V.A.
17. See, e.g., infra Part V.A.
18. I use the term “illustrate” purposefully. I do not suggest that the differences
between Oregon and Washington’s statutes are representative of all of the 9 permutations
of the states’ intergovernmental agreement statutes.
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II. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS ARE A NECESSARY
COMPONENT OF RESILIENCY.
Multi-jurisdictional agreements for emergency response and aid at
all levels of government are a common tool for creating resilient communities. A number of interstate compacts focus specifically on crossborder responses. The most comprehensive of the lot is the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) between all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and three territories, which allows cross-border
assistance when there is a governor-declared state of emergency.19 Other interstate emergency response compacts specifically involve civil defense, forest fire suppression, earthquake assistance, and deployment of
the National Guard.20 Nearly all of the states bordering Canada and
Canadian provinces bordering the United States have emergency assistance agreements with each other for firefighting, 21 and many have
agreements for other emergency assistance. 22 Governments at all levels
commonly have intergovernmental agreements with other governments
to provide emergency response,23 frequently pursuant to specific statutory authorization for mutual aid.24
However, in addition to reducing risk of disaster and increasing capacity to recover from disaster, resiliency should also be measured by a
community’s ability to provide basic services and infrastructure prior to
19. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, (congressional consent given at
Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996)).
20. There are more than a dozen such compacts. The National Center for Interstate
Compacts at the Council of State Governments maintains a searchable database of nearly all
interstate compacts. Compact Name Search, NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS,
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/ (last visited May 21, 2014).
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY & PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA,
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. - CANADA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE MECHANISMS (2012),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/policy/btb-compendium-of-us-canadaemergency-management-assistance-mechanisms.pdf; International Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut and the Provinces of Québec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova
Scotia and Newfoundland) (congressional consent given by Pub. L. No. 110-171, 121 Stat.
2467 (2007)); State and Province Emergency Management Assistance Compact (Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, New York, and
Wisconsin, and the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Saskatchewan),
congressional consent given by Pub. L. 112-282, 126 Stat. 2486 (2013)).
22. See, e.g., Michael C. McDaniel, Beyond ‘Beyond the Border’: A Proposal for

Implementation of the Action Plan’s Recommendation on Cross-Border Critical
Infrastructure, 37 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 433, 435 (2012).
23. See, e.g., Mutual Aid Agreement Between Wasco, Hood River and Sherman Fire
Defense Districts and Klickitat and Skamania County Fire Protection Agencies, Final Draft
6-14-13 (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MASTER COOPERATIVE FIRE
PROTECTION AGREEMENT 2012, NORTHWEST OPERATING PLAN, OREGON STATEWIDE
OPERATING PLAN, WASHINGTON STATEWIDE OPERATING PLAN (May 16, 2012) (involving three
federal agencies and two state agencies, and discussing mobilization of local fire service) (on
file with author).
24. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.091 (West, Westlaw current with 2014
Legis. effective through March 31, 2014).
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any shock, disaster, or change. In the same way that emergency assistance agreements stabilize communities in times of crises, nonemergency intergovernmental agreements stabilize communities by enabling them to maintain or expand their services and infrastructure so
that communities have services to provide or share through mutual aid
in times of emergencies. These agreements are not written for the purpose of creating resiliency, but they are important (and sometimes necessary) tools for creating resilient communities.
For example, redundancy, an indicator of resilience, 25 may be impossible for small towns to achieve acting alone. Towns that can afford
only two or three maintenance workers have no redundancy because
most tasks require a crew of two or more to complete repair and
maintenance tasks and ensure worker safety. One crew may be able to
handle most maintenance tasks most of the time, but those workers
cannot take vacations, cannot stay home sick, or cannot respond to two
events. However, neighboring towns, each with two or three workers,
can create two or three shared crews.26 Intergovernmental agreements
formalize natural interdependencies by allowing communities to right
size their operations in ways that communities could not accomplish
acting alone. Indeed, this is the stated purpose of several states’ intergovernmental cooperation statutes. For example, the declaration of purpose in Washington State’s Interlocal Cooperation Act states,
It is the purpose of this chapter to permit local governmental
units to make the most efficient use of their powers by enabling
them to cooperate with other localities on a basis of mutual advantage and thereby to provide services and facilities in a manner and pursuant to forms of governmental organization that
will accord best with geographic, economic, population and other
factors influencing the needs and development of local communities.27
Partnerships between governments, universities, businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and foundations are common themes in
resilience analyses.28 Intergovernmental agreements are one such partnership. However, other than mutual aid agreements, they unfortunately get little attention in resilience literature.
25. Godschalk, supra note 12, at 139; see also JOHN D. MOTEFF & CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PROGRAMS
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2012) (defining redundant as: “[A] number of functionally
different components so that the entire system does not fail when one component fails.” .
26. Interview with Don Stevens, Mayor, North Bonneville., in White Salmon, Wash.
(Nov. 5, 2013). Mayor Stevens uses this for an example when giving public talks about the
“Three Cities Initiative” discussed in Section V, below.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.010 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. effective
through March 31, 2014).
28. See, e.g., Hill et al., supra note 6, at 57–58.
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III. STATE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR
INTERSTATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS.29
All states authorize intergovernmental agreements in one or more
ways. First, nearly all states have a statute that broadly authorizes intergovernmental agreements, using terms such as interlocal cooperation, intergovernmental agreements, joint exercise of powers, or no particular term.30 These generally applicable statutes also contain require29. Although much of this article focuses on Oregon and Washington, there is little
law concerning authority for, or use of, intergovernmental agreements in any one state.
Therefore, general principles of law discussed in this section cite sources nationally.
30. ALA. CODE § 11-102-1 (West, Westlaw current through Act 2014-68 of the 2014
Regular Session); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-952 (West, Westlaw current through the First
Regular and First Special Sessions of the Fifty-first Legislature); ARK. CODE ANN. 25-20-101
(West, Westlaw current through end of 2013 Regular and First Ex. Sessions, including
changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through 1/1/2014, and emerg. eff. Acts from
2014 Fiscal Sess.); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6500 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation
through Ch. 9 of 2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-1-203 (West, Westlaw current with Chapters 1-3 and 5-7 of the Second
Regular Session of the 69th General Assembly); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-339a (West,
Westlaw current through the 2014 Supplement to the General Statutes of Connecticut,
Revision of 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.01 (West, Westlaw current with Chapters in effect
from the 2014 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legislature through March 31, 2014); GA. CODE
ANN. § 36-69A-1 (West, Westlaw current through Act 351 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 67-2326 to 2333 (2006); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 220 § 1 (West, Westlaw current
through P.A. 98-627 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-7-1 (West, Westlaw
current through P.L. 29 of the Second Reg. Sess. of the 118th General Assembly with effective
dates through March 13, 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28E.1 (West, Westlaw current with
immediately eff. Legis. signed as of 4/4/2014 from the 2014 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 122901 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Reg. and Spec. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
65.210 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the 2013
extraordinary session); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1324 (West, Westlaw current through the
2013 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 30-A, § 2203 (West, Westlaw current with
emergency Legis. through Chapter 492 of the 2013 Second Reg. Sess. of the 126th Leg.); MD.
CODE ANN. LOCAL GOV’T § 1-901 (West, Westlaw current through chapter 1 of the 2014 Reg.
Sess. of the General Assembly); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 40, § 4A (West, Westlaw current
through Chapter 61 of the 2014 2nd Annual Session); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 124.502
(West, Westlaw current through P.A.2014, No. 63, of the Reg. Sess., 97th Legislature); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 471.59 (West, Westlaw current through Chapter 147 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-13-1 (West, Westlaw current through end of 2013 Reg. Sess. and 1st &
2nd Ex. Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 70.220 (West, Westlaw current with emergency legis.
approved through Feb. 19, 2014, of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess. of the 97th General
Assembly); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-11-101 (West, Westlaw current through the 2013 Session,
and the 2012 general election); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-801 (West, Westlaw current
through End of 2013 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.080 (West, Westlaw current
through the 2013 77th Reg. Sess. and the 27th Spec. Sess. of the Nevada Leg.); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 53-A:3 (Current through Chapter 2 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40A:65-1 (West, Westlaw current with laws effective through L.2014, J.R. No. 1); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 11-1-1 (West, Westlaw current through all 2013 legislation, and including Ch. 6, 11,
24, 25, 28, 31, 32, 37, 40, 58, 70, 71, 79-81, of the Second Reg. Sess. of the 51st Legislature
(2014)); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o (McKinney current through L.2014, chapters 1 to 17);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-460 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 2013 Reg.
Sess. of the General Assembly); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-40-01 (West, Westlaw current
through the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 63rd Legis. Assembly); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 715.02,
307.15 (West, Westlaw current through Files 1 to 76, and 78 of the 130th; OKLA. STAT. ANN.

2014]

STATE BORDER TOWNS AND RESILIENCY: BARRIERS
TO INTERSTATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

199

ments for, and restrictions on use of, intergovernmental agreements. 31
Most of these general statutes have their roots in two past efforts to
promote scholarship and use of intergovernmental agreements. First, in
1956, the Council of Governments 32 drafted a suggested “Interlocal Cooperation Act.”33 Second, in 1967, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations34 made some revisions to the Council of State
Governments’ suggested act and adopted its own suggested legisla-

TIT.

74, § 1001 (West, Westlaw current through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary
Sess. of the 54th Leg.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.003 (West, Westlaw current with
emergency legis. through Ch. 80 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–2317
(West, Westlaw current through Reg. Sess. Act 2014-21); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-40.1–2
(West, Westlaw current with amendments through chapter 534 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-7-60, 6-1-20 (current through end of 2013 Reg. Sess.)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 6-17-1 to 6-17-15 (Current through the 2013 Reg. Sess. and Supreme Court Rule 13-17);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-9-101, 5-1-113, 5-1-114 (West, Westlaw current with laws from the
2014 Second Reg. Sess., eff. through Feb. 28, 2014); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 791.002 (West,
Westlaw current through the end of the 2013 Third Called Sess. of the 83rd Leg.); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 11-13-101 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Second Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 24, § 4901 (West, Westlaw current through the laws of the First Sess. of the 20132014 Vermont General Assembly); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1300 (West, Westlaw current
through End of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the End of 2013 Sp. S. I and includes 2014 Reg. Sess.
cc. 1, 2 and 8); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.34.010 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis.
effective through March 31, 2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-23-3 (West, Westlaw current with
laws of the 2014 Reg. Sess. S.B. 444); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0301 (West, Westlaw current
through 2013 Act 146, published 3/28/2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-101 (West, Westlaw
current through the 2013 General Sess.). Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, and
Hawaii do not have general intergovernmental agreement statutes.
31. E.g., ALA. CODE § 11-102-2 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-191 of 2014 Reg.
Sess. 2014) (restricting joint powers contracts to three-year terms); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
163.01(7)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2nd Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting a separate legal
intergovernmental entity from levying any type of tax or issue bonds in its own name).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-186 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Reg.
Sess.). The Council of State Governments (CSG) is a research and policy organization serving
state governments. About CSG Regional Offices, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS,
http://www.csg.org/about/default.aspx (last visited May 21, 2014). All fifty states are
members. Id.
33. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS ON SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, THE COUNCIL
OF STATE GOV’TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR 1957 93–97 (1956)
[hereinafter COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS].
34. The United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR), a research agency similar to the Administrative Conference of the United States,
existed between 1959 and 1996. Pub. L. No. 86-380, 73 Stat. 703 (1959), created ACIR. The
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-52, 109 Stat. 468, 480 (1995), terminated ACIR. The ACIR statutes remain in the U.S.
Code. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4271–4279 (2012) (42 U.S.C.A. ch. 53 Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations). For a recent symposium on the history, accomplishments, and
vision for a reconstituted Advisory Commission, see John Kincaid & Carl W. Stenberg,

Introduction to the Symposium on Intergovernmental Management and ACIR Beyond 50:
Implications for Institutional Development Research, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV.158 (2011) and
other symposium articles.
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tion.”35 Many of the states’ generally applicable intergovernmental
agreement statutes still contain elements of these suggested acts.
This article focuses on these general statutes; however, there are
other sources of authority. All states, including those without a general
statute, have statutes that reference, authorize, or mandate requirements for intergovernmental agreements for specific purposes.36 Different types of municipalities may also be subject to different statutory and
regulatory requirements for providing the same service.37 One quarter of
the states also have provisions in their constitutions that authorize intergovernmental cooperation.38 Finally, common law may be another
source of authority. For example, some courts have upheld intergovernmental agreements pursuant to a municipality’s general contracting
authority or other pre-existing authority, even where the agreement
would not be permissible under statutory authority for intergovernmental agreements.39
Most generally applicable intergovernmental agreement statutes
expressly authorize agreements that cross state borders. The Council of
35. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A HANDBOOK FOR
INTERLOCAL
AGREEMENTS
AND
CONTRACTS
24–28
(1967),
available
at
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/m-29.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY
COMM’N].
36. For example, more than 200 distinct statutory sections in Arizona refer to or
authorize intergovernmental agreements for a specific purpose. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 11-952, 9-461.11, 15-1470, 36-2925 (2013). See also McNeill v. Harnett County, 398
S.E.2d 475, 479 (N.C. 1990) (affirming charges pursuant to intergovernmental agreement
authorized by statutes specifically allowing agreements between counties and water and
sewer districts).
37. See, e.g., Durango v. Durango Transp., Inc., 807 P.2d 1152 (Colo. 1991)
(reversing a court of appeals decision concluding that a city could provide mass transit free
from the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission, but a county was subject to PUC
jurisdiction).
38. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 13 (West, Westlaw through the legislation effective
March 26, 2014, passed during the 2014 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 28th Legislature); COLO.
CONST. art. XIV, § 18 (West, Westlaw current with amendments adopted through the Nov. 5,
2013 General Election); FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (West, Westlaw current through Nov. 6,
2012, General Election); GA. CONST. art. IX, § III ¶ I(A) (West, Westlaw current through Act
351 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; (West, Westlaw current with
amendments through Act 4 [End] of the 2013 2nd Special Sess.); ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 10
(West, Westlaw through 4/1/2014); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 20 (West, Westlaw current through
the 2013 Reg. Sess.); MICH. CONST. art III, § 5; MO. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (West, Westlaw
current through emergency legis. approved February 19, 2014, of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess.
of the 97th General Assembly); MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (West, Westlaw current through
the 2012 general election); NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 18 (West, Westlaw current through the
End of 2013 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(C) (West, Westlaw current through L.2014,
chapters 1 to 17); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (West, Westlaw current through Reg. Sess. Act
2014-21); S.C. CONST. art. VII, § 13; S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (West, Westlaw current through
the 2013 Reg. Sess. and Supreme Court Rule 13-17).
39. See, e.g., Utah Cnty v. Ivie, 137 P.3d 797 (Utah 2006) (holding that the county
and city had independent authority to undertake actions in an agreement for the county to
condemn property for a road and for the city to pay the expenses of condemnation,
installation, and maintenance of the road, thus the agreement was valid even though the
intergovernmental cooperation act did not authorize agreement).
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State Governments explained that it drafted the 1957 suggested act
with the intent that it could be used “between or among communities
whether or not they are located within a single state.” 40 Most general
statutes require the attorney general or another state official to review
and approve (or not object to) cross-border agreements. For example, in
Oregon, the attorney general must approve agreements in which Oregon
public agencies seek to enter into with public agencies of other states. 41
In Washington, the state official with constitutional or statutory authority, or jurisdiction over providing the service or facility that is the subject of the cross-border agreement, must approve the agreement.42
Despite this apparent authority for interstate intergovernmental
agreements, there are two reasons these generally applicable intergovernmental cooperation statutes are not optimal for encouraging interstate intergovernmental agreements. The first reason is that specific
provisions in many of the states’ intergovernmental cooperation statutes
may have the effect of prohibiting or discouraging interstate intergovernmental agreements. This article focuses on two of the fundamental,
and perhaps the most potentially disabling, provisions: declaring an interstate intergovernmental agreement to be an interstate compact and
the differing powers required of each party to enter into an intergovernmental agreement. I purposefully say, “potentially disabling.” There
are many interstate intergovernmental agreements; most ignore the
compact question. There are no reported cases in any state challenging
the validity of an interstate intergovernmental agreement based on a
compact provision, and few cases address the powers question. Nevertheless, the possibility for challenge remains. The second reason is that
intergovernmental cooperation statutes do not abrogate any of the requirements and restrictions in the states’ substantive authorities, so
interstate intergovernmental agreements may be subject to two (or
more) sets of legislative and regulatory standards. Communities that
wish to engage intergovernmental arrangements where the states’ statutes conflict or lack reciprocal authority must plan for time and expense
to craft complex workarounds.
IV. BARRIERS TO INTERSTATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AGREEMENTS.
A. Interstate Intergovernmental Agreements as Interstate Compacts
Eleven states have intergovernmental cooperation statutes that
contain a provision declaring agreements between a public entity
(broadly defined to include the full suite of local and state government)
40. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 94.
41. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.420 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 2014 Reg. Sess.).
42. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.34.050 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis.
effective through March 31, 2014).
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in that state and an agency in another state to, “have the status of an
interstate compact.”43 This compact provision originated in the Council
of State Governments’ 957 suggested Interlocal Cooperation Act, 44 and
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations preserved it
in its 1967 suggested legislation. 45 Neither suggested act explained the
need for this provision. The Council of State Governments simply noted,
“It is clear that [relationships with neighboring subdivisions on the other side of the state boundary] are possible when cast in the form of interstate compacts.”46 Similarly, the Advisory Commission stated, “Normally, intergovernmental contracts or agreements which are interstate
need only be authorized by statute in both of the States and, if necessary, by constitutional provision.”47
Embedded in both suggested acts is a legal presumption, which I
believe is incorrect, that an interstate intergovernmental agreement is
the equivalent to an interstate compact. An interstate compact is an
agreement between states as states, that is, an agreement between the
sovereigns.48 One hallmark (although not a universal rule) of an interstate compact is that each party state’s legislature enacts the compact, 49
followed by the necessary governor’s action. Alternatively, the text of a
legislatively enacted compact may authorize administrative officials to
join that specific compact.50 In either situation, a compact is between the

43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-20-105 (West, Westlaw current through end of 2013 Reg.
and First Ex. Sess., including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through
1/1/2014, and emerg. eff. acts from 2014 Fiscal Sess.: 210); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-7-8 (West,
Westlaw current through 2014 Second Reg. Sess. of the 118th General Assembly); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 28E.9 (West, Westlaw current with legis. from the 2014 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2905 (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Reg. and special Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 65.290 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the 2013
extraordinary session); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.160 (West, Westlaw current through the
2013 77th Reg. Sess. and the 27th Spec. Sess. of the Nevada Leg.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §
1005 (West, Westlaw current through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary Sess. of
the 54th Legislature (2013)); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-40.1-5 (West, Westlaw current with
amendments through chapter 534 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 12-9-105
(West, Westlaw current through Feb. 28, 2014 of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV.
CODE § 39.34.040 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. effective through March 31,
2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0303(4) (West, Westlaw current through 2013 Act 146, published
3/28/2014).
44. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 93 (suggested act at § 5).
45. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 27 (suggested act at § 5).
46. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 94 (suggested act at § 7).
47. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 27–28 (suggested act at § 7).
48. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 42 (1994 (“An
interstate compact, by its very nature, shifts a part of a state’s authority to another state or
states, or to the agency the several states jointly create to run the compact.” (quoting
MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 300 (1971).
49. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Dep’t of Transp., 7 8 A. d 48 (Pa. 998 (where compact
text requires states enact the compact into law, a statute authorizing the state secretary of
transportation to enter into the compact was not an effective enactment).
50. See,
e.g.,
Interstate
Library
Compact,
NCIC,
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=89 (last visited May 21, 2014).

2014]

STATE BORDER TOWNS AND RESILIENCY: BARRIERS
TO INTERSTATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

203

states as states.51 In contrast, legislatures do not enact, ratify, or review
interstate intergovernmental agreements. In the states where review of
such agreements is required, it is the attorney general or another state
official that does so.52 For this reason alone, a state’s broadly applicable
intergovernmental cooperation statute cannot, by operation of law, elevate an intergovernmental agreement (i.e., an agreement between subdivisions of the states) or in some cases, home rule entities, to the status
of an agreement between states as states.
Another legal problem with this compact provision exists when only
one of the states has a compact provision in its intergovernmental cooperation statutes. The eleven states with a compact provision make up
forty-five state borders, only six of which are between states where both
states have a compact provision.53 Three of the states with a compact
provision do not share any border with a state that has a compact provision.54
Even assuming that an intergovernmental agreement statute can,
as a matter of law, elevate an agreement to the status of an interstate
compact, an interstate compact cannot exist unless all of the party
states intend to create a compact. 55 That mutuality does not exist unless
all party states have declared an interstate intergovernmental agreement to be an interstate compact. That mutuality does not exist on thirty-nine of the forty-five borders of the states with compact provisions.
Additionally, nearly all of the states’ intergovernmental agreement
statutes specify that an interstate intergovernmental agreement must
meet the other state’s legal requirements.56 Thus the general statutes in
states without a compact provision would prohibit an agreement because the agreement could not comply with the compact provision in the
first state. Neither the Council of State Governments nor the Advisory
Commission’s suggested acts addressed the lack of mutuality when only
one state declares an interstate intergovernmental agreement to have
the status of an interstate compact.57
51. For more on interstate compacts generally, see CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE
EVOLVING USE AND CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE
(ABA Publ’g
6 ; JEFFREY B. LITWAK, INTERSTATE COMPACT LAW: CASES & MATERIALS
(2012); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 2012).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 44.
53. The borders where both states have a compact provision are ArkansasTennessee, Arkansas-Oklahoma, Indiana-Kentucky, Iowa-Wisconsin, Kansas-Oklahoma,
and Kentucky-Tennessee.
54. Id. The states with a compact provision that do not border any state that also
has a compact provision are Nevada, Washington, and Rhode Island.
55. BROUN ET AL., supra note 51, at 21 (describing compacting process as offer,
acceptance and consideration).
56. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 190.420(1) (West, Westlaw current with emergency
legis. through Ch. 80 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.).
57. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 93–97; ADVISORY COMM’N, supra
note 35, at 24–28.
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The compact provision also raises political concerns. Since the
1950s and 1960s, the law of interstate compacts has evolved such that
the Council of State Governments and the Advisory Commission probably did not anticipate the complexities of declaring an interstate intergovernmental agreement to be an interstate compact. One such complexity is the U.S. Constitution’s requirement for congressional consent
for interstate compacts.58 Although the text of the Constitution specifies
the requirement for consent without restriction, the U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted the compact clause to require consent in two situations:
(1) when the compact enhances the power of the states to the detriment
of federal supremacy,59 or (2) when the compact enhances the power of
the compacting states to the detriment of non-compacting states.60
There is ample room for debate and litigation over whether consent is
actually required.61 The Council of State Governments and the Advisory
Commission dismissed this concern by asserting that interstate intergovernmental agreements “lie squarely within State jurisdiction and
therefore raise no question of the balance of the federal system.” 62 This
statement was probably too broad back in the 1950s and 1960s because
consent is dependent on the subject matter of each agreement. 63 The
Council of State Governments and the Advisory Commission may be
correct most of the time, but at least one interstate intergovernmental
agreement has received consent.64 This illustrates that parties to an interstate intergovernmental agreement cannot hastily dismiss the possibility of needing congressional consent for their agreement.
Second, the possibility of congressional consent for interstate intergovernmental agreements raises another issue, one that neither the
Council of State Governments nor the Advisory Commission addressed:
that consent transforms an interstate compact into federal law. Although the Supreme Court’s clearest statement to this effect long postdated the model acts,65 the underpinnings of the transformation of a
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, CL. 3. The compact clause states, “No State shall,
without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State.” Id.
59. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 4 4 U.S. 45 , 46 ( 978 .
60. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159,
175–76 (1985).
61. One example of protracted litigation involves the Multistate Tax Compact. See
U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 452. There is current debate about whether the National
Popular Vote bill, an interstate compact, might require consent. See Myths about Interstate
Compacts
and
Congressional
Intent,
NAT’L
POPULAR
VOTE,
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/answers/section.php?s=16 (last visited May 21,
2014).
62. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 7.
63. BROUN ET AL., supra note 51, at 37.
64. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 166, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) (“[g]ranting the consent of
Congress to the A Mutual Aid Agreement between the city of Bristol, Virginia, and the city of
Bristol, Tennessee.”
65. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 4 , 44 ( 98 (stating, “But where Congress has
authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement and the subject matter of that
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compact into federal law predated the model acts. 66 Additionally, in the
decades since the Council of State Governments and the Advisory Commission published their suggested acts, courts have concluded that compact entities do not enjoy the states’ immunity from suit in federal
court;67 the compact preempts or supersedes conflicting state law and
state constitutions under federalism and contract principles; 68 compacts
have equal footing as congressionally enacted federal statutes in a conflict-of-laws analysis;69 courts apply federal law standards when con-

agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, Congress’ consent
transforms the States’ agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.” .
66. Id. at 438 n.7 (citing Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n. v. Colburn, 310 U.S.
419, 427 (1940)).
67. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 56 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting (Justice O’Connor lamented, “Despite several invitations, this
Court has not as yet had occasion to find an interstate entity shielded by the Eleventh
Amendment from suit in federal court.” .
68. See, e.g., Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Electric Power & Cons.
Planning Council, 786 F. d 59, 7 ( 986 (stating, “A state can impose state law on a
compact organization only if the compact specifically reserves its right to do so.” ; Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery Cnty., Md., 706 F.2d 1312,
1318–19 (4th Cir. 1983) (Maryland may confer on an interstate agency federal quick-take
condemnation powers that are not available to state agencies under Maryland’s
Constitution); Stephans v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 697 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (D. Nev.
1988) (the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s regional plan preempts state law and state
constitutional provisions, and dismissed a takings claim based on the Nevada Constitution);
Alcorn v. Wolfe, 827 F. Supp. 47, 53 (D.D.C. 1993) (Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority’s compact provision specifying that appointments to the authority are made for a
specific term superseded the Virginia Constitution under which political appointees are
removable-at-will); Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Prot. Ass’n v. Gould, 674 P. d 9 4, 9 –23
(Colo. 1984) (state constitutional and statutory laws apply only to water that has not been
committed to other states by an interstate compact or a United States Supreme Court
decree); Frontier Ditch Co. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 761 P.2d 1117, 1124 (Colo.
1998 (concluding, “Thus, to the extent that there might be some arguable conflict between
[the compact’s] Article VI B’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to Kansas and the Colorado
water court’s jurisdiction [granted in that state’s constitution], Article VI B is the supreme
law of the land and governs the rights of the parties in this case.” .
69. See, e.g., NYSA–ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y.
Harbor, 732 F.2d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 1984) (compact that had received congressional consent
was not preempted or superseded by federal ERISA statute); Am. Sugar Refining Co. v.
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 4 N.E. 2d 578, 586–87 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that since
a compact provision is “federal law,” conflicts between compact provisions and federal
statutes cannot be resolved by “preemption” analysis, but by an analysis of whether one
“impliedly repeals” another ; Lake Tahoe Watercraft Recreation Ass’n v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 4 F. Supp. d 6 , 7 (E.D. Cal. 998 (“To the extent the two federal
schemes [i.e., the Clean Water Act and the Tahoe Compact] conflict, the Compact should be
given effect ‘because it is a congressional enactment passed later in time and, is more specific
than the [Clean Water Act] as it is limited to a very narrow geographical area.’” ; City of S.
Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 664 F. Supp. 75, 78 (E.D. Cal. 987 (“The
only common ground of the [Compact and the Airline Deregulation Act] is geographic and
perhaps incidental but is not substantive. As for this geographic overlap, the Compact is
clearly more specific and enacted later in time.” .
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struing a compact;70 and a compact entity’s rules and actions are federal
law71 or have some federal character.72 Even compacts that do not require consent have some “supra-state”73 characteristics.74
Finally, the Council of State Governments and the Advisory Commission observed that declaring an intergovernmental agreement to be
an interstate compact raises the question whether the states, rather
than the signatory local government parties, might be liable for actions
under the agreement.75 The Council of State Governments explained,
[T]he usual interstate compact is an instrument to which states
are party. Since the contemplated [intergovernmental] agreements should be the primary creation and responsibility of the
local communities, the [suggested] act makes them the real parties in interest for legal purposes and places the state more in
the position of guarantor. Since this means that the obligation is
enforceable against the state if necessary, the [intergovernmental] agreement will have all the necessary attributes of a compact. However, the state in turn is protected by the requirement
of prior approval of the agreement by state authorities and by
70. See, e.g., N.Y. State Dairy Foods, Inc. v. Ne. Dairy Compact Comm’n, 6 F.
Supp. 2d 249, 260 (D. Mass. 1998) (applying the federal Chevron method for review of the
compact agency’s interpretation of its federal consent statute ; Friends of the Columbia
Gorge v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n,
P. d 64, 74 (Or.
9 (same .
71. See, e.g., Stephans v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 697 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (D.
Nev. 988 , (expressly stating that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s regional land use
plan is federal law); R.I. Fishermen’s Alliance v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 585 F.3d 42, 49
(1st Cir. 2009) (satisfying the well-pleaded complaint requirement because the Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission management plan is federal law).
72. See, e.g., League to Save Lake Tahoe v. B.J.K. Corp., 547 F.2d 1072, 1073 (9th
Cir. 976 (stating, “Questions arising under the TRPA Land Use Ordinance enacted
pursuant to the Compact do not automatically give rise to Section 1331(a) jurisdiction,
because the Compact is not an ordinary federal statute and the Ordinance is not directly
analogous to the Code of Federal Regulations. Interstate compacts occupy a unique position
in our federal system.” ; Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge
Comm’n., 171 P.3d 942, 969–70 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d in relevant part, 213 P.3d 1164,
1189 (Or. 2009) (applying federal deferential review under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
( 997 , to the Columbia River Gorge Commission’s interpretation of its own regulations ;
Klickitat Cnty. v. State of Wash., 86 P. d 6 9, 6 4 (Wash. Ct. App. 99 (stating, “The
[Columbia River Gorge] Commission’s land management plan and the [federal] act’s
provisions relative to the plan are federally mandated, and do not constitute a state
program.” .
73. For a description of an interstate compact as “supra-state, sub federal,” see
BROUN ET AL., supra note 51, at 1.
74. See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 89 (1823). In this case, the first compact
case at the U.S. Supreme Court, Kentucky had enacted laws that conflicted with its compact
with Virginia. Using a contracts analysis and without any reference to consent, the Court
questioned, “Can the government of Kentucky fly from this agreement, acceded to by the
people in their sovereign capacity, because it involves a principle which might be
inconvenient, or even pernicious to the State, in some other respect? The Court cannot
perceive how this proposition could be maintained.” The Court also concluded that
Kentucky’s enactments violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 92–93.
75. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 94.
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the provisions of Section 5 preserving the state’s right of recourse against a non-performing locality.76
The Advisory Commission adopted this explanation almost verbatim.77 To address this concern, section 5 of both suggested acts specifies
that the parties to the agreement are the “real parties in interest and
[that] the state may maintain an action to recoup or otherwise make
itself whole for . . . damages or liability [that] it may incur by reason of
being joined.”78 All of the states that still have a compact provision contain this liability provision.79
A question to ponder is whether a state official would be willing to
approve an interstate intergovernmental agreement if he or she understood that approving the agreement would raise the following issues: 1)
whether the agreement is actually an interstate compact, 2) whether the
agreement requires congressional consent,
the potential “supra-state”
nature of the agreement, 4) approving the agreement might open the
state to liability, and 5) the possibility of litigation to recoup damages or
liability the state might incur in an action involving the agreement.80
A compact provision is unnecessary to create effective and binding
interstate intergovernmental agreements. More importantly, a compact
provision is a legal barrier to interstate intergovernmental cooperation
along most of the borders of the states that have such a provision. And
on the remaining borders, the parties may not want to invoke the established principles of compact law for their agreement. For these reasons,
a compact provision may discourage interstate intergovernmental cooperation; the states that have a compact provision should simply repeal
that provision.

76. Id.
77. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 25.
78. Id. at 27 (suggested act at § 5); COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 96
(suggested act at § 5).
79. ARK. CODE ANN. §25-20-105(b)(1)−(2) (West, Westlaw through Reg. and First
Ex. Sess. 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-7-8 (West, Westlaw through P.L.29 of Second Reg.
Sess. 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28E.9 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2905 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. and Sp. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
65.290 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.160 (2013);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 1005 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 23 (End) of First Ex. Sess. Of
54th Legis. 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-40.1-5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 534 of 2013
Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 12-9-105 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Reg. Sess.);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.34.040 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis. effective
through March 31, 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0303(4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act.
146).
80. For a description of the paucity of scholarly and political literature and low level
of familiarity about compact by lawyers, legislators, and others, see BROUN ET AL., supra note
51, at xvii; LITWAK, supra note 51, at i.
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B. Powers Needed for an Intergovernmental Agreement
The compact provision affects interstate intergovernmental agreements in about 40% of the states’ borders;81 however, the issue of authority could affect interstate intergovernmental agreements at all borders.82 Intergovernmental cooperation statutes follow one of two approaches for specifying the powers parties must possess to undertake an
intergovernmental agreement. Like the compact provision, the distinction between these two approaches has its history in the Council of
State Governments and Advisory Commission’s suggested acts. The
Council of State Governments’ 957 suggested act authorized municipalities to enter into an agreement if at least one of the parties had such
power.83 The Advisory Commission’s 967 suggested act modified this
authority to allow states to elect to use the original 1957 language or
use language that restricted intergovernmental agreements to situations where only all municipalities to the agreement independently had
authority to undertake the action.84 This more restrictive approach does
not require independent authority to perform the subject activity in
each of the other contracting municipalities’ jurisdictions; it means
simply that each municipality has the authority to perform the subject
activity within its own jurisdiction.85 State intergovernmental cooperation statutes that do not directly descend from the suggested acts or that

81. See supra text accompanying notes 15.
82. This issue could affect all of the state borders because many specific statutory
authorities for intergovernmental agreements specify the parties’ necessary powers, some of
which differ from a state’s generally applicable intergovernmental cooperation statute, and
some of which supersede those general statutes. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 124.503
(West Westlaw through P.A.2014, No. 36, of the 2014 Reg. Sess.) (generally applicable
statute specifying that a conflicting specific statute would control); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:1724.9 (West, Westlaw 2014 L.2013, c. 284 (End) and J.R. No. 18) (specific statute specifying
that it would control over generally applicable statute).
83. COMM. OF STATE OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 95 (suggested act at § 4, stating,
“Any power or powers, privileges or authority exercised or capable of exercise by a public
agency of this state may be exercised and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency of this
state . . .” .
84. ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 35, at 6 (“Any power or powers, privileges or
authority exercised or capable of exercise by a public agency of this state may be exercised
and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency of this state [having the power or powers,
privilege or authority] . . .” . The bracketed text is the optional language that would limit
municipal powers.
85. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.59(1) (West, Westlaw through Reg. Legis. Sess.
2014 (authorizing agreements where the powers “are the same except for the territorial
limits within which they may be exercised” ; City of Medina v. Primm, 57 P. d 79, 8
(Wash.
7 (“[T]he question under RCW 39.34.080 is whether the city is authorized to
perform the type of governmental activity that is the subject of the agreement.” (emphasis in
original)); Durango Transp., Inc. v. City of Durango, 824 P.2d 48, 49–53 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing several cases in accord); W. Wash. Univ. v. Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., 79 P. d 989,
99 (Wash. Ct. App. 99
(stating the “[u]niversity’s power to enter into interlocal
cooperation agreements is expressly subject to the university’s obligations and
responsibilities under the [State] Higher Education Personnel Law” .
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were amended so that the suggested act’s language is no longer recognizable typically use language that suggests one of these approaches. 86
Oregon follows the less restrictive approach originally suggested by
the Council of State Governments, so that all parties to an intergovernmental agreement in Oregon may exercise powers in an intergovernmental agreement if at least one of the parties has such powers. 87 In
contrast, Washington elected to use the latter, more restrictive approach.88 Oregon’s approach allows a greater breadth of intergovernmental cooperative arrangements. This fundamental difference between
the Oregon and Washington intergovernmental cooperation statutes
means that border towns in Oregon that could broadly use intergovernmental agreements with other state and local entities in Oregon do not
have all of the same opportunities to do so with Washington entities.
What is not clear is the extent that statutes restrict the opportunities for Oregon communities to enter into agreements with Washington
communities. The Washington Attorney General’s opinion is that the
parties to an agreement must have only the general authority in question.89 But this opinion does not explain the extent that express differences in the states’ substantive statutes may prevent performance of
nominally similar tasks. For example, the law governing Washington’s
housing authorities contains unit number and interior space percentage
requirements that Oregon law does not.90 Would an Oregon housing authority thus be unable to perform services in Washington pursuant to an
agreement with a Washington housing authority? Few court decisions
have invalidated an intergovernmental agreement for lack of mutual
powers and there is no consensus about how mutual the parties’ powers
must be.91
86. See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and
the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 122 (2003) (discussing the difference between the
states in terms of “the debate between the ‘mutuality of powers’ approach and the ‘power of
one unit’ approach” .
87. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.010 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 2014 Reg. Sess.).
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.030(5) (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legis.
effective through March 31, 2014).
89. Training Indian Tribal Police Officers, 1978 No. 18 Op. Att’y Gen. of the State of
Wash.
(June
1,
1978),
available
at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/AGOOpinions/opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=15228#.Uv6vHU2Yb
cs (stating that Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission could provide
training to tribal police officers through an interlocal agreement even though the
Commission did not have express authority to train tribal police).
90. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.120 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 of the
2014 Reg. Sess.), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.82.070 (West, Westlaw through 2014
Legis. effective through March 31, 2014).
91. See Reynolds, supra note 86, at 135–36 (comparing In re Condemnation of 30.60
Acres of Land, 572 A.2d 242 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (upholding an agreement between a
township and a school district to construct a school and park because both entities had
condemnation authority, although the township could only condemn land for park purposes
and the school could only condemn land for use as a public school), with Gallagher v. City of
Omaha, 204 N.W.2d 157 (Neb. 1973) (invalidating an agreement between a university and
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Unlike a compact provision that is legally unnecessary, prohibitive
of most agreements, and may stun officials who understand the nature
and law of interstate compacts, the states’ variations on the required
powers of the parties to an agreement reflect political value, judgment,
and history. One approach enhances the powers of the parties to the
agreement; the other approach only maintains the existing powers of
the parties.92 I do not suggest that one approach is better than the other
for intrastate intergovernmental agreements; however, states with border towns that have few opportunities to cooperate intrastate need
broad authority and flexibility to cooperate with towns in the adjacent
state to facilitate the town’s interdependent and interdisciplinary potential (i.e., resiliency). In other words, states might consider the former,
more expansive approach for interstate intergovernmental agreements,
even if they would follow the the latter, more limited approach for solely
intrastate agreements.
V. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO CROSS-BORDER
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
Two remote border areas illustrate innovative ways that Oregon
and Washington communities are overcoming legal barriers between the
states.
A. Leveraging Federal Authority in the National Scenic Area
Cascade Locks in Oregon and Stevenson and North Bonneville in
Washington are close in distance to each other, but remote relative to
other intrastate neighbors.93 Cascade Locks is 20 miles west of Hood
River, Oregon and 25 miles east of the Portland metropolitan area.94 To
the north, it is adjacent to the Columbia River (and thus the state line
the city “to construct and use parking facilities on city park land” because neither entity “had
the power to engage in all of the activities” of the agreement .
92. Compare United Water Res., Inc. v. N.J. Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 685 A. d
24, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (concluding that the intergovernmental cooperation
act “was not intended as a vehicle to enhance the enumerated powers granted to local
units” , aff’d, 701 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1997), and Dahl v. City of Grafton, 286 N.W.2d 774, 780
(N.D. 979 (“Cooperation agreements still must be limited to the performance of functions
falling within the framework of the powers already possessed by the municipality under
other statutes.” , and CP Nat’l Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 6 8 P. d 5 9, 5 (Utah
1981) (citing Utah Code § 11-13-14, which states that municipalities may contract with one
another “to perform any governmental service, activity, or undertaking which each public
agency . . . is authorized by law to perform,” and concluding “the intent of the [ICA] appears
to be to allow the municipalities collectively to exercise powers which they already possess
individually.” , with Cnty. of Wabash v. Partee, 6 8 N.E. d 674, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 99 (“The
agreement is valid so long as either the city or the county has the right to undertake the task
required under the agreement . . . . The very purpose of section 10 of article VII of the 1970
Constitution is to allow a local government to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly,
as long as it is otherwise lawful.” .
93. See RAND MCNALLY, THE 2013 ROAD ATLAS 108 (2013).
94. See id.
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with Washington); to the south is Mt. Hood National Forest. 95 Stevenson
and North Bonneville are 25 miles west of White Salmon, Washington
and 25 miles east of Camas, Washington.96 To their south is the Columbia River (and thus the state line with Oregon); 97 to their north is a
combination of state and national forest land. 98 The Bridge of the Gods
over the Columbia River connects the cities and all three cities are located within the federally designated Columbia River Gorge National
Scenic Area.99 In
, these three cities developed a joint “White Paper” describing their interest to identify and develop initiatives, priorities, and shared roles; experiment with new and innovative ways to provide services to people and communities; and develop more effective and
efficient methods of serving people.100 Specifically, the communities
identified three priorities for cooperation—wastewater treatment, emergency response services, and education and schools101—and each city
enacted a resolution committing to those identified areas of cooperation.102 The White Paper and each resolution referred to the unique legal structure of the National Scenic Area as authority for their interstate intergovernmental cooperation.103
The federal Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act created the National Scenic Area and authorized Oregon and Washington to
enact an interstate compact (the Columbia River Gorge Compact) to
create a bi-state Columbia River Gorge Commission for the purpose of
regional land use planning.104 The National Scenic Area Act has two
purposes: first, “to protect and provide for enhancement of” Gorge resources, and second “to protect and support the economy of the Columbia River Gorge area by encouraging growth to occur in existing urban
areas and” to allow economic development consistent with the first purpose.105 Within the National Scenic Area, there are thirteen urban are-

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.; see generally Bridge of the Gods: Port of Cascade Locks, Oregon, PORT

CASCADE LOCKS, OREGON, http://portofcascadelocks.org/bridge-of-the-gods/ (last visited
May 21, 2014).
100. White Paper Outlining the Three Cities’ Initiatives in Partnership with the
Columbia River Gorge Commission (Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Three Cities’ Initiatives] (on
file with author).
101. Id.
102. CASCADE LOCKS, Or., Res. 1265 (2013); North Bonneville, Wash., Res. 456
(2012); Stevenson, Wash., Res. 2013-256 (2013).
103. CASCADE LOCKS, Or., Res. 1265 (2013); North Bonneville, Wash., Res. 456
(2012); Stevenson, Wash., Res. 2013-256 (2013); Three Cities’ Initiatives, supra note 100.
104. 16 U.S.C. § 544b (2012). The Columbia River Gorge Compact is codified at OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.150 (through end of the 2013 Reg. and Sp. Sessions) and WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.97.015 (through all 2013 legislation).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 544a (2012).
OF
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as,106 which have urban boundaries that the Commission may revise if
the communities have met specified standards. 107 The urban areas are
nominally exempt from the land use regulations under the National
Scenic Area;108 however, to qualify for an urban area boundary revision,
the urban areas must demonstrate that the revision would be consistent
with the purposes of and land use regulations for the National Scenic
Area and that the revision “would result in maximum efficiency of land
uses within and on the fringe of existing urban areas.” 109 These standards thus make the Scenic Area authorities indirectly applicable to urban areas.
Cascade Locks, North Bonneville, and Stevenson have specifically
asserted that these authorities for the National Scenic Area authorize
interstate intergovernmental cooperation necessary for the town’s economic development independent of state law restrictions. 110 These cities
are thus asserting a form of localism, that is, obtaining authority directly from federal law, which would preempt conflicting state law.
Localism is not new; however, it has received recent scholarly attention111 following (but not all related to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2004 decision in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League ,112 in which the
Court concluded that the federal Telecommunications Act, which broadly preempts state and local laws that prohibit the ability of any entity to
provide telecommunication services, did not preempt a Missouri state
law that prohibited political subdivisions from providing telecommunication services.113 The Court started its analysis in Nixon with its welltrod preemption jurisprudence, stating that a federal act preempts state
law when it contains an “unmistakably clear” statement to that effect.114
However, the Court did not apply this standard further.115 Instead, the
Court’s analysis turned to other factors.116 Relevant to the Three Cities’
White Paper, the Court reasoned, in part that if the FCC did preempt
the state restriction, “[t]he municipality would be free of the statute, but
freedom is not authority, and in the absence of some further, authorizing legislation the municipality would still be powerless to enter the tel-

Id. § 544b(e).
Id. § 544b(f).
Id. § 544d(c)(5)(B).
Id. § 544b(f)(2)(B)–(C).
Three Cities’ Initiatives, supra note 100.
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local
Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959 (2007); Colloquium, Why the
Local Matters: Federalism, Localism, and Public Interest Advocacy, Papers from the
Eleventh Annual Liman Colloquium at Yale Law School (2008), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/why_the_local_matters_final_122109.pdf; Laurie Reynolds, A Role
for Local Government Law in Federal-State-Local Disputes, 43 URB. LAW. 977 (2011).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 130 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991)).
See id. at 131–35.
See id.
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ecommunications business.”117 The Court continued, “[t]here is, after all,
no argument that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is itself a source
of federal authority granting municipalities local power that state law
does not.”118 Preemption has always been more complicated than the
presence or absence of an “unmistakably clear” statement; it has always
depended on the interrelationship between the federal and state statutes at issue.119 Following Nixon, preemption may now also depend on
the presence of other federal or state authority.120
Cascade Locks’s, North Bonneville’s, and Stevenson’s initiatives are
still in their infancy.121 There are too many unknown or undecided variables in those initiatives for this article to discuss whether the National
Scenic Area Act is itself a source of authority for interstate intergovernmental cooperation such that it would preempt the different powers
issue, other statutory differences between Oregon and Washington’s intergovernmental cooperation statutes, 122 and specific state laws otherwise applicable to the cities’ initiatives. Nevertheless the initiative’s
progress is worth watching because regardless of the preemption issue,
the cities’ assertion that their cooperation implements the second purpose of the National Scenic Area Act, and thus the Columbia River
Gorge Compact,123 may overcome the problem of only Washington having a compact provision. In other words, the cities are suggesting that
their agreements, which implement an existing compact, satisfy the
purpose of the compact provision in Washington’s intergovernmental
cooperation statute without needing to declare that each individual
agreement is itself a compact.124 This novel argument also overcomes
the consent problem discussed above because the Gorge Compact already has the consent of Congress.125 There should be no surprise that
the agreement might have a “supra-state” effect because the Washington and Oregon courts have already acknowledged this in past jurisprudence relating to the National Scenic Area.126

117. Id. at 135.
118. Id.
119. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
120. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 135.
121. See Three Cities’ Initiatives, supra note 100.
122. For example, Oregon authorizes intergovernmental entities to issue revenue
bonds. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.080(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 of the 2014 Reg.
Sess.). But Washington statutes contain no such authority.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 103, 104.
124. See generally Three Cities’ Initiatives, supra note 100.
125. See supra text accompanying note 104.
126. E.g., Columbia River Gorge Comm’n v. Hood River Cnty., 5 P. d 997, 1003–
4 (Or. Ct. App.
7 (holding that Oregon’s
4 Ballot Measure 7 does not apply in the
National Scenic Area because the land use regulations in the National Scenic Area are
required by federal law); Klickitat Cnty. v. State, 862 P.2d 629, 634 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
(since the Gorge Compact was an instrument of federal law, “[t]he Commission’s land
management plan and the act’s provisions relative to the plan are federally mandated.” .
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Few border areas have an existing compact relating to land use
planning that could serve as authority for interstate intergovernmental
cooperation.127 Thus, the cities’ White Paper and resolutions to cooperate under the authority of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic
Area Act constitutes one example of the innovative thinking necessary
for small towns to cooperate across state lines.
B. State Agreements and a Variance to Provide Emergency Services to
Mill Creek Road
Northeastern Umatilla County, Oregon is rural—very rural.128 The
only reliable year-round access to its Mill Creek Road is from Walla
Walla, Washington. In 2002, the Mill Creek Road area (officially Ambulance Service Area #6 (“ASA” ) generated approximately 4 calls per
year.129 Response time within the ASA from Milton-Freewater, Oregon
is a minimum of 45 minutes; response from Walla Walla, Washington
reduces that time to 20 minutes.130
Providing faster emergency services to Mill Creek Road presented a
statutory and regulatory problem for Umatilla County. Oregon statutes
require a license from the Oregon Health Authority,131 and the cost of
that license was approximately $3,000 per year. 132 Oregon Health Authority regulations do not require an out-of-state EMS provider to be
licensed in Oregon when merely transporting a patient through the
state (i.e., the patient does not originate in Oregon and is not being
transported to a facility in Oregon), when transporting a patient from a
facility in Oregon to a facility in another state, or when transporting a
patient originating outside Oregon to a facility in Oregon. 133 None of
those exceptions applied to the Mill Creek Road situation because the
transportation of a patient from Mill Creek Road, Oregon to Walla Walla, Washington involved an out-of state EMS provider transporting a
patient originating in Oregon to an out of state facility.
The road to cross-border emergency services illustrates the complexity of working in an area with conflicting state laws. In 1989, the
127. See, e.g., Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §
66800 (West 2013) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 277.200, consent granted by Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94
Stat 3233, 3253 (1980); Delaware Valley Regional Planning Compact, codified at N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 32:27-1 to 32-27-30 and 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 701, consent granted by Pub. L. No. 8770, 75 Stat. 170 (1961).
128. State & County QuickFacts Umatilla County, Oregon, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Jan. 6, 2014, 17:37:09 EST), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/41/41059.html (stating
that Umatilla’s population density was only 23.6 people per square mile in 2010).
129. Letter from Thomas W. Johnson, Dir., Ctr. for Env’t and Health Sys., State of
Or. Dep’t of Human Servs. Health Div., to William S. Hansell, Chairperson, Umatilla Cnty.
Bd. of Comm’rs, (June 6,
(on file with author).
130. Id.
131. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.045, 682.047 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 80 of the
2014 Reg. Sess.).
132. Letter from Thomas W. Johnson, supra note 129.
133. Or. Admin. R. 333-265-0070 (2012).
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Washington Department of Social and Health Services and the Oregon
Department of Health (now Oregon Health Authority) entered into an
agreement authorizing “ambulance services from either state [to …]
transport a patient from that state into the other state, or they can
transport a patient from the other state into their state.” 134 However,
this agreement was ambiguous concerning the practice of emergency
medical response and the handling of complaints registered against a
transporting agency.135 In 2000, when Umatilla County approached
Walla Walla to provide services to the Mill Creek Road area, Walla Walla would not rely on the agreement. In 2002, Umatilla County thus
sought a variance from the Oregon Health Authority to allow Walla
Walla EMS personnel to serve that portion of Umatilla County, which
the Oregon Health Authority approved.136 That variance did not contain
assurances concerning medical practice, risk, and authority that satisfied Walla Walla.137 Subsequently, the states clarified the 1989 Agreement,138 which satisfied Walla Walla’s concerns. Only then did Umatilla
County and Walla Walla finalize their agreement for Walla Walla to
provide ambulance services to the Mill Creek Area of Umatilla County.139
Unlike the three cities considering how to preempt state law, Walla
Walla, Umatilla County, and the states’ health agencies worked together on an innovative outside-the-box solution within existing state statutes and regulations. To the extent state agencies can broadly interpret
their authorities or grant case-by-case variances, they can facilitate
common-sense outcomes and overcome conflicting state laws. However,
state agencies must be alert to do so comprehensively, clearly, and in a
timely manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
A resilient community has redundancies and is interdependent on
other communities. Yet, not all communities have the same opportunities to use intergovernmental agreements to create resiliency. Border
communities that have no intrastate neighbors must rely on shared ser134. Agreement between State of Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. Emergency
Med. Servs. and State of Or. Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs. (Mar. 8, 989
[hereinafter Agreement] (on file with author). This agreement is a type of interstate
intergovernmental agreement. There is no mention of the agreement being considered an
interstate compact as Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 39.34.040 (West 2013) requires.
135. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Umatilla Cnty., Order No. BCC
-38 (Oct. 16, 2002)
(on file with author).
136. Letter from Thomas W. Johnson, supra note 129.
137. City of Walla Walla, Agenda Item History Sheet (Nov. 20, 2002) (on file with
author).
138. Memorandum from Elizabeth E. Morgan, Program Representative, NREMT-P,
to Grant Higginson, Acting Adm’r, OPHS, et al. (Oct. 7,
(on file with author).
139. Agreement, supra note 134.
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vices and joint infrastructure with communities in the adjoining state;
however, the differences in the states’ authorities for interstate intergovernmental agreements and conflicting state statutes and regulations
limit opportunities for cross-border cooperation.
Statutory authorities for mutual aid agreements and assistance are
broad and overcome many of the hurdles posed by statutory and regulatory differences in times of emergency, but these statutes presume that
communities have the basic services and infrastructure that they can
use to provide that emergency aid. Interstate intergovernmental agreements are a critical component to ensuring that basic level of services
and infrastructure. As part of creating resilient communities, states
must review their internal law to eliminate barriers to interstate cooperation or be willing to help or step out of the way of communities working for themselves.

